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The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the 
LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part VI 
MARC SPINDELMAN* 
I. THE SHOWER’S WONDER WEAPONIZED1 
If, at times, gender and sexual confusion operated deceptively lightheartedly 
during oral arguments in Gerald Bostock and Donald Zarda’s cases, it didn’t 
lack for prospects of being weaponized against the gay sex-discrimination 
positions in them. Here it is being turned to advantage as part of a challenge to 
the claim that anti-gay discrimination is sex discrimination prohibited by Title 
VII. The official transcript of oral arguments in these cases records a 
distinctively intense—and important—exchange between Justice Samuel Alito 
and Pamela Karlan.2  
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(2020); Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex 
Discrimination Cases, Part II, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 87 (2020); Marc Spindelman, The 
Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part III, 
81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 101 (2020) [hereinafter Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, Part 
III]; Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex 
Discrimination Cases, Part IV, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 117 (2020); and Marc Spindelman, 
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At this moment, Justice Alito is conjuring the social figure of a same-sex 
attracted person whose biological sex as male or female is unknown. In Justice 
Alito’s estimation, this person embodies the reasons that Karlan’s argument 
must be rejected.3 The conceptual point Justice Alito is making by pointing to 
this homosexual person of unknown sex is that sexuality and sex are wholly 
independent concepts, and that sexual orientation discrimination cannot, 
therefore, be equated with sex discrimination under Title VII. In articulating this 
position, Justice Alito advances the suggestion that, since it’s imaginable that 
an employer could engage in anti-homosexual discrimination without ever 
knowing the sex of the homosexual person he’s discriminating against, because 
it’s unclear in some hypothetical instance whether the homosexual being 
discriminated against is a he or a she, it cannot be said that anti-homosexual 
discrimination is categorically “because of sex.” This idea falls apart even as 
Justice Alito is offering it, in view of the fact that same-sex sexual attraction, as 
Justice Alito is imagining it, is itself sex-based and sex-dependent—“because 
of sex” in that respect—even if it isn’t at all certain in which of binary sex’s 
directions, male or female, it is aimed.4 Ironically, given how the argument here 
proceeds from a space of category blurring, bisexuality—as a sexual orientation 
that includes both cross-sex and same-sex attractions—is nowhere in sight.5 
Significant for present purposes is not so much how Justice Alito’s 
argument interfaces with Title VII sex discrimination doctrine, nor, for that 
 
.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/17-1618_7k47.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TZZ 
-FHMR] [hereinafter Bostock Transcript]. 
 3 See id. Arguments along those lines appeared earlier. Id. at 8–9 (statement of Chief 
Justice John Roberts); id. at 29–30 (statement of Justice Samuel Alito); id. at 45–47 
(statements of Justice Neil Gorsuch and Jeffrey Harris); id. at 51–52 (statement of Justice 
Alito); see also infra note 4. It may be worth considering tracing Justice Alito’s thinking on 
this point with his thinking in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 
2035 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would hold that an employer cannot 
be held liable for taking an adverse action because of an employee’s religious practice unless 
the employer knows that the employee engages in the practice for a religious reason.”). 
Thanks to Martha Chamallas for pointing out the connection. 
 4 This point was precisely expressed by Justice Gorsuch in the oral arguments in 
Bostock this way:  
     And I think the response from the other side is: But the statute has a more generous 
causal -- . . . formulation, a but-for causal formulation, so perhaps you’re right that, at 
some level, sexual orientation is surely in -- in play here. But isn’t sex also in play here 
because of the change of the first variable? 
Bostock Transcript, supra note 2, at 45–46; see also id. at 60 (“[W]e’ve made very clear 
there’s no search for sole cause in Title VII -- part of that is you fired the person because he 
was a man.”) (statement of Justice Elena Kagan).  
 5 The “epistemic contract of bisexual erasure,” discussed generally in Kenji Yoshino, 
The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000), and in different 
ways in Heron Greenesmith, Drawing Bisexuality Back into the Picture: How Bisexuality 
Fits into LGBT Legal Strategy Ten Years After Bisexual Erasure, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 65 (2010), persists. 
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matter, whether it is right or wrong (though it’s wrong), than how it posits a sex-
binaristic but sex-uncertain homosexually inclined person as the figure who can 
be looked to in order to dispositively resolve the gay sex-discrimination cases. 
Here, that sex uncertainty, which actually, as will be explained, relates to an 
underlying gender and sexual confusion, is the centerpiece of Justice Alito’s 
attack. This is the exchange: 
     JUSTICE ALITO: But what if the decision maker makes a decision based 
on sexual orientation but does not know the biological sex of the person 
involved?  
 
     MS. KARLAN: Well, there is no reported case that does that. And I –  
 
     JUSTICE ALITO: All right. . . . But what if it -- . . . [w]hat if it happened? 
We have had a lot of hypotheticals of things that may or may not have 
happened.  
 
     What if that happens? Is that discrimination on the basis of sex where the 
decision maker doesn’t even know the person’s sex?  
 
     MS. KARLAN: And -- and how do they know the person’s sexual 
orientation?  
 
     JUSTICE ALITO: Because somebody who interviewed the candidates tells 
them that.  
 
     MS. KARLAN: And they are unable to tell anything about the person’s sex?  
 
     JUSTICE ALITO: No.  
 
     MS. KARLAN: So this is Saturday Night Live Pat, as -- as an example, 
right? 
  
     JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I’m not familiar with that.  
 
     MS. KARLAN: Okay. 
 
     JUSTICE ALITO: But – 
 
     MS. KARLAN: Which is the person named Pat, and you can never tell 
whether Pat is a man or a woman.  
 
     I mean, theoretically that person might be out there. But here is the key –  
 
     JUSTICE ALITO: Theoretically what?  
 
     MS. KARLAN: Theoretically that person might be out there. But here is the 
key: The -- the cases that are brought are almost all brought by somebody who 
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says my employer knew who I was and fired me because I was a man or fired 
me because I was a woman.  
 
     Somebody who comes in and says I’m not going to tell you what my sex is, 
but, believe me, I was fired for my sexual orientation, that person will lose.  
 
     JUSTICE ALITO: Well, if that’s the case, then I think your whole argument 
collapses because sexual orientation then is a different thing from sex.  
 
     MS. KARLAN: Of course it is. No one has claimed that sexual orientation 
is the same thing as sex. What we are saying is when somebody is fired –  
 
     JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let me amend it. Your argument is that sex -- 
discrimination based on sexual orientation necessarily entails discrimination 
based on sex. 
 
     But if it’s the case that there would be no liability in the situation where the 
decision maker has no knowledge of sex, then that can’t possibly be true.  
 
     MS. KARLAN: If there was that case, it might be the rare case in which 
sexual orientation discrimination is not a subset of sex.  
 
     But in the case where the person knows the sex of the person that they’re 
firing or refusing to hire, and knows the sex of the people to whom that person 
is attracted, that is sex discrimination, pure and simple.6  
 
Past Karlan’s attempt at levity—and its painful reminder that, not so long ago, 
many people found Julia Sweeney’s performance as “Pat” on Saturday Night 
Live very funny—was the eminently serious effort by Karlan to reach for, and 
to identify, a concrete social personage who, while perhaps unfamiliar from the 
caselaw, would nevertheless fit the bill that Justice Alito had in mind. How 
could Karlan know Justice Alito would not know who “Pat” was?7     
What’s striking about this exchange is that it is precisely uncertainty about 
where a homosexual body sits on which side of what Justice Alito takes to be 
the two-sided line of sex difference that packs the conceptual punch it is meant 
to deliver. It is exactly the inability here to say just “who’s who and what’s 
what” with someone like Saturday Night Live “Pat”—is this person a lesbian 
woman or a gay man?—that serves as the foundation for saying, along the lines 
 
 6 Bostock Transcript, supra note 2, at 67–70. Although laughter is not noted on the 
official transcript after Pamela Karlan’s mention of Saturday Night Live “Pat,” it can be 
heard in the audio of the exchange. Oral Argument at -2:31, Bostock v. Clayton Cty.; 
Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, Nos. 17-1618,  17-1623 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.sup 
remecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2019/17-1618.  
 7 For a recentish account of Julia Sweeney’s character “Pat” that includes some 
critique, see Dave Itzkoff, Who Is Julia Sweeny Coming to Terms with? It’s Pat, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/arts/television/julia-sweeney-pat-
snl.html [https://perma.cc/62ZGCTVE]. 
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of Justice Alito’s thought, that if “Pat” were discriminated against for having a 
homosexual sexual orientation nobody could then say “Pat” was discriminated 
against because of his or her sex.8 Modestly, it seems safe to say not that this 
exchange involves a “‘wonder’ or epistemic panic,” but that it works by 
leveraging a “‘wonder’ or epistemic” problematic that is being formulated as 
the ratio decidendi for the case.9 Sex uncertainty—gender confusion in 
homosexuality in this sense—disproves Karlan’s case.  
However straightforward Justice Alito’s hypothesized thinking may 
initially seem, in blurring the lines between lesbians and gay men by means of 
a figure like Saturday Night Live “Pat,” the Justice’s remarks raise the prospect 
that recovery from the kind of head-spinning he reported experiencing upon 
encountering all the comparisons in the parties’ briefs may be slow-going.10 For, 
in imagining in his own way, or in searching for, a “Pat”-like figure who defies 
easy binary sex classification, Justice Alito’s line of questioning doesn’t simply 
strategically blur the line between lesbians and gay men. The questioning 
frustrates that line in a more thoroughgoing sense. This is because “Pat” exactly 
offers no clear same-sex sexual identity reference point to build on to be able to 
know whether “Pat” is lesbian or gay. In saying this, though it may take a 
moment to recognize it, Justice Alito’s provocation, plainly aimed at sharpening 
and shoring up the sexual orientation/sex divide (to say sexual orientation 
discrimination is not sex discrimination), weakened and even effectively 
eliminated the distinction between lesbians and gay men and between 
homosexual and trans identities. “Pat,” after all, in today’s terms is much more 
likely to be identified first and foremost as gender non-binary, or maybe 
genderfluid or genderqueer, hence as someone who might well identify and/or 
be identified as trans, not—certainly not necessarily—as either a lesbian woman 
or a gay man.11 This is a reminder now of what many people couldn’t quite get 
with back in the day: the full humanity, dignity, and equal worth and respect 
that someone like “Pat” is entitled to—not themselves any properly normative 
source of amusement. Living outside conventional sex-binaristic gender and 
sexual boxes and not just surviving but flourishing in one’s own way is a 
 
 8 The language of “[w]ho’s who and what’s what” comes from Kendall Thomas, 
Shower/Closet, 20 ASSEMBLAGE 80, 81 (1993). 
 9 On the expression “‘wonder’ or epistemic panic,” see id. For some discussion of it, 
see Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, Part V, supra note 1, at 144–48. 
 10 See Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, Part V, supra note 1, at 148–49 (discussing 
Justice Alito’s “frank description of his own experiences encountering the various arguments 
being made by the parties to the gay sex-discrimination cases”); see also id. at 149 n.59 
(discussing work suggesting that the experience of gender confusion in this setting can be 
understood to be a function of what it is to experience the sublime).  
 11 Not to say they never would or might, recalling the “strategic” deployments of 
various labels. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Mutilating Gender, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES 
READER 315, 322 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006) (“I recognize that the use of 
any word for myself—lesbian, transperson, transgender butch, boy, mister, FTM fag, 
butch—has always been/will always be strategic”) (italics in original); see also supra note 
7. 
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testament to the power and beautiful variations of humankind and how human 
beings can live in—and dream—the world. 
Importantly, the actual dynamics of Justice Alito’s maneuvering pushed 
Karlan (perhaps, ironically, partly because of her own invocation of Saturday 
Night Live “Pat”) onto terrain that she, like David Cole, had carefully avoided 
treading when making their affirmative cases. Both Bostock and Zarda’s cases, 
and Aimee Stephens’s, as well, were organized around arguments that placed 
sex-binaristic sexual orientation and sex-binaristic trans identities at center 
stage. The basic, pro-LGBT litigation positions in all the LGBT Title VII sex 
discrimination cases effectively sidelined nonbinary, genderfluid, and 
genderqueer people.12 In Justice Alito’s exchange with Karlan, they returned as 
figures whose role was to help crystallize why the anti-gay sex-discrimination 
claim should fail.  
Among the items importantly illustrated by the dynamics of the Justice 
Alito-Pamela Karlan exchange is the shared sense, and shared in Stephens’s 
case, too, that the parties to the litigation functionally agreed that “sex” was and 
should fundamentally remain organized around a binaristic understanding—an 
understanding that, critically viewed, participates in the legal construction, 
legitimation, normalization, and even the naturalization, of male-female sex 
difference. This understanding of “sex” discrimination requires individuals—
cis, straight, lesbian, gay, trans—to identify themselves in Title VII sex 
discrimination litigation as being male or female, hence at some point as being 
on one or the other side of the sex-difference divide, if they are to benefit from 
the safe-harbors of this law.13 Seen this way, the pro-LGBT claims in the Title 
VII sex discrimination cases are very important and socially and personally 
meaningful, but they are ultimately incrementalist law reform efforts that, on 
their own, do not without more open a radical channel calling sex-binarism as 
such into doubt. Not even Cole’s position in Stephens’s case did. Instead, it 
made a provisionally conservative case organized around sex discrimination 
being understood as discrimination involving the sex one is “assigned at 
birth.”14 Karlan’s willingness to bring up Saturday Night Live “Pat,” and to 
 
 12 It wasn’t only on the Justices that the Supreme Court, institutionally speaking, was, 
and in many ways was left to be, a TLIC (a trans-low-information Court). The story here is 
complicated. Important dimensions of it are traced in Ezra Ishmael Young, What the 
Supreme Court Could Have Heard in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC and 
Aimee Stephens, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 11 (2020) (describing the argument “that 
progressive litigators and theorists also bear some blame” for “why judges ignore the text 
and construe sex discrimination laws not to protect transgender people”). 
 13 For related thoughts, see generally Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction, in 
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 1 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Katherine M. 
Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997). 
 14 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argument 
s/argument_transcripts/2019/18-107_4gcj.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X32-Y5GT] [hereinafter 
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make in part, a casual, but not meanspirited, joke of them, in other terms 
revealed a bid to press this non-binary figure back to the margins of the case and 
hold them there. 
These descriptions of litigation strategy aside, if the differentiations 
between gay and trans identities, vital for many people including inside the 
LGBT communities, are taken as readily defeated in the ways that Justice 
Alito’s remarks can be taken to suggest, then the distinction between the gay 
and trans shower scenes is subject to being defeated, too. If this is right, it 
reopens the analytic supplied by Kendall Thomas’s “Shower/Closet” as a tool 
by which to understand a few final, but still vital, aspects of the case.  
Stated overarchingly and programmatically, the trans/gay shower scene is, 
culturally speaking, the threat that it is because of its capacity to make people, 
including those accustomed and attached to traditional ways of thinking about 
gender and sexuality, wonder both about others—and themselves—in ways that 
can be or anyway feel radical, revolutionary, and crushing. 
Consider in this light John Bursch’s characterization of the implications that 
he thinks necessarily and inevitably follow from judicial recognition of trans 
sex-discrimination rights. He begins by telling the Supreme Court during his 
oral argument that: “[T]he Sixth Circuit [in Aimee Stephens’s case] said that 
sex itself is a stereotype.”15 From that point, Bursch’s thinking rapidly escalates 
to a highly panicky pitch:  
     And Mr. Cole agrees with that 100 percent. Everything that he said this 
morning, sex itself is a stereotype. You can never treat a man who identifies as 
a woman differently because to do that is sex discrimination. When you do 
that, there is no sex discrimination standard under Title VII anymore. It’s been 
completely blown up.16  
 
In saying this, Bursch is formally referring to the “sex discrimination standard 
under Title VII.”17 That’s what he is technically saying has “been completely 
blown up.”18 But his anchor for that standard—the meaning of “sex” under Title 
 
Harris Funeral Homes Transcript] (“We are accepting the narrowest -- for purposes of this 
case, the narrowest definition of sex and -- and arguing that you can’t understand what Harris 
Homes did here without it treating her differently because of her sex assigned at birth.”); 
accord Young, supra note 12, at 11, 28–31 (noting and critiquing the litigation strategy).  
 15 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 14, at 44. 
 16 Id. at 44–45 (emphasis added).  
 17 Id. at 44.  
 18 Id. at 45. Bursch made the same basic point earlier on in response to a question from 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: “All of the distinctions between men and women are gone 
forever.” Id. at 38. Thinking like this has at times been placed at the feet of the sex-equality 
radicalism within second-wave feminism. See RYAN T. ANDERSON, WHEN HARRY BECAME 
SALLY: RESPONDING TO THE TRANSGENDER MOVEMENT 150–52 (2018) (engaging 
SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION 
(1970), as the “logical (if dystopian) conclusion” of Simone de Beauvoir’s ideas in SIMONE 
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VII—itself traces back through the “original public meaning” of “sex” under 
Title VII to sex difference understood as an objective, biological, material fact.19 
Bursch’s position had seemed to be that this fact is a rock, an account of sex’s 
fixed and inalterable nature. Here, however, it stands exposed as nothing more 
than an incredibly dense, foundational cultural reference point—something that 
can be, and is being, though it should absolutely not be being, “blown up.”20 
And “blown up” by pro-trans sex-discrimination arguments that function as a 
type of social or cultural dynamite.21 Follow the Sixth Circuit’s lead, he’s telling 
the Court, and the known world of sex-difference will be “completely” 
destroyed, cease to exist. What happens in that world? Who’s who and what’s 
what in it after that cataclysmic event?22  
The purportedly clarifying example of this dystopian situation is in a primal 
scene that involves the violences attendant upon sex difference’s destruction. 
Significantly, the very next sentence after Bursch says that the Sixth Circuit’s 
and Cole’s pro-trans positions have “completely blown [sex] up” picks up like 
this: “One other point on the restroom scenario. . . .”23 And then he’s off to the 
races, talking about the shower and locker room scene.  
Far less feverish, hence less irredeemably panicked, are the still-stirred-up 
thoughts that Justice Neil Gorsuch shared earlier during the oral arguments in 
Stephens’s case. An exchange with David Cole that was widely reported in press 
accounts of the oral arguments begins with Justice Gorsuch remarking how 
“drastic a change in this country” it would be for the Supreme Court to alter the 
rules about “bathrooms in every place of employment and dress codes in every 
place of employment.”24 After some back-and-forth, Justice Gorsuch invites 
Cole to “assume for the moment” that he’s “with [Cole] on the textual evidence. 
 
DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1949), “about the oppressiveness of the female body,” and 
describing Firestone’s work’s aim as not just “eliminating . . . ‘male privilege’ but any 
distinction at all between the sexes,” and then quoting Firestone’s work, in part, to the effect 
that “the end goal of feminist revolution must be . . . not just the elimination of male privilege 
but of the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings would no longer 
matter culturally”) (emphasis in original). For additional discussion of the instability of “sex” 
as a category, see Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, Part III, supra note 1, at 115 n.53. 
 19 The precise language is “original public and legal meaning.” Harris Funeral Homes 
Transcript, supra note 14, at 30. 
 20 Id. at 45 (“blown up”).  
 21 Id. (“blown up”). 
 22 The language of “[w]ho’s who and what’s what” here tracks language found in 
Thomas, supra note 8, at 81.  
 23 Id. at 45. 
 24 Id. at 24; see, e.g., Adam Liptak & Jeremy W. Peters, Supreme Court Considers 
Whether Civil Rights Act Protects L.G.B.T. Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/supreme-court-gay-transgender.html 
[https://perma.cc/QV6R-3KP7] (noting the exchange and describing Justice Gorsuch as 
“worried about ‘the massive social upheaval’ that would follow from a Supreme Court 
ruling” that “Title VII may well bar employment discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and transgender status”). 
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It’s close, okay? We’re not talking about extra-textual stuff. We’re -- we’re 
talking about the text. It’s close. The judge finds it very close.”25 Justice 
Gorsuch continues:  
     At the end of the day, should he or she take into consideration the massive 
social upheaval that would be entailed in such a decision, and the possibility 
that -- that Congress didn’t think about it --  
     . . . and that -- that is more effective -- more appropriate a legislative rather 
than a judicial function? That’s it. It’s a question of judicial modesty.26 
Almost perfectly, the answer Justice Gorsuch reaches on his own question, 
found in judicial role and function—“[i]t’s a question of judicial modesty”—is 
an expression that is classically culturally coded as a question of a feminine 
virtue.27 In this setting, “judicial modesty” is the feminine virtue that Lady 
Justice properly possesses.28 Knowing that Justice Gorsuch is talking about 
himself at this moment, it is interesting that he frames the inquiry in the form of 
what a judge, “he or she,” is supposed to do looking at things the way that he 
does. Ostensibly a generous reference to the female Justices on the Court, it 
doesn’t quite work. None of those Justices—even recognizing Justice Elena 
Kagan’s aphoristic “we’re all textualists now”—precisely shared his 
commitments to his preferred method of statutory interpretation and his 
concerns about “massive social upheaval” in the case.29  
Alternatively, of course, the observations may mark how easy it is for a male 
Justice’s identifications to retrace the male-female sex binary and then move 
seamlessly back and forth between “he or she” in the context of this case, 
particularly after Cole had expressly invited Justice Gorsuch, earlier on, to 
imagine a rule asking “you or me to dress as a woman,” which Cole affirmed 
 
 25 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 14, at 26. 
 26 Id. at 26–27. This wasn’t the first time during the argument that Justice Gorsuch 
mentioned modesty. See id. at 25 (“Mr. Cole, the question is a matter of the judicial role and 
modesty in interpreting statutes that are old.”). 
 27 For the quoted language, see id. at 27 (“It’s a question of judicial modesty.”). For 
discussion that includes the answer Justice Gorsuch provides to his own question, see id. at 
25–27. 
 28 Id.; Marc Spindelman, Obergefell’s Dreams, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1094 (2016) 
(discussing the theme in the context of Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 29 The language of “massive social upheaval” is from Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, 
supra note 14, at 26. For Justice Kagan’s observation that “we’re all textualists now,” see 
Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the 
Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg&feature=emb_title (quoted language arrives at 8:29). See, e.g., 
Margaret Talbot, Is the Supreme Court’s Fate in Elena Kagan’s Hands?, NEW YORKER 
(Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine /2019/11/18/is-the-supreme-
courts-fate-in-elena-kagans-hands [https://perma.cc/XA6X-GG7Z] (“In the past few 
years, she has repeatedly declared an intellectual allegiance to textualism when it comes to 
interpreting statutes. ‘We are all textualists now,’ she said in 2015, at Harvard Law School. 
‘The center of gravity has moved.’”). 
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both of them “would consider . . . a significant harm.”30 Still, the feminine 
identification of the proper modesty a judge is supposed to show when 
interpreting a federal statute is readily returned to the feminine virtues 
threatened in the shower scene. The problem with trans sex-discrimination 
rights, on this level, is that they threaten feminine “modesty” and virtue that 
ought to be preserved. If so, it looks like Bursch’s argument may have reached 
home at this moment.  
Against that prospect is the considerable distance between Justice 
Gorsuch’s talk of “massive social upheaval” and Bursch’s impassioned rhetoric 
of “completely blow[ing sex] up.”31 All the important action here seems likely 
to involve how Justice Gorsuch struggles in a wrestle that moves between the 
logics of feminine modesty associated with the Court’s institutional authority 
and the feminine modesty of the shower scene, which implicates Lady Justice 
herself, but in ways that may not easily be pinned down.32 Is Lady Justice in the 
shower the paragon of cis-feminine virtue who must be protected from an 
invading force? Or is she, in truth, with that famous sword of hers, the trans 
figure who must be stopped? Might she be both figures at once? A sign of the 
Court’s capacity to inflict injury that makes it an imaginary victim and 
perpetrator both? What’s a Member of the Supreme Court to do? Who can tell 
at this point who’s who here and what’s what?33 
Seen in terms of some of these deeper and more far-reaching resonances, 
Cole’s initial reply to Justice Gorsuch’s fears is only partially responsive. The 
“federal courts of appeals,” Cole tells Justice Gorsuch, “have been recognizing 
that discrimination against transgender people is sex discrimination for 20 
years,” and “[t]here’s been no upheaval,” much less any “massive social 
upheaval.”34 As an account of the social world, including the world of the 
American workplace governed by a developed and developing body of sex 
discrimination law, Cole is right: Trans sex-discrimination rights have in no way 
involved a “massive social upheaval.”35 It is vital to get and stay very clear on 
that point. 
But if, as seems possible, Justice Gorsuch’s concerns didn’t singularly run 
along the plane of logic and reason that Cole imagined, if, as seems possible, 
Justice Gorsuch was speaking from and toward rumblings operating on other 
levels—levels of cultural fantasy, of cultural myth—on which he, like others, 
 
 30 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 14, at 10; see also id. at 16 (“CHIEF 
JUSTICE ROBERTS: But if the claim is it discriminates because I am a transgender 
individual, that’s not your claim?”). 
 31 Id. at 26–27 (statement of Justice Gorsuch); id. at 45 (statement of John Bursch). 
 32 This is not to forget Lady Justice’s blindfold, though its implications for and in the 
scene may for the moment be bracketed. 
 33 The language of “who’s who here and what’s what” tracks language in Thomas, 
supra note 8, at 81.  
 34 The first quote is from Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 12, at 27; the 
second, id. at 26.  
 35 Id.  
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may have felt a sense that male-female sex difference and the social ways of 
being it has long organized are implicated by Stephens’s case and may be altered 
by a pro-trans decision in it in ways he couldn’t fully predict—if that’s where 
Justice Gorsuch was coming from when expressing his concerns about “massive 
social upheaval,”36 then Cole’s initial answer, savvy as it was, did not meet its 
mark.  
Cole, seeming generally aware of this, offers a follow-up. Turning away 
from all the ways that trans women had been holding and would again hold the 
Supreme Court’s attention, he showcases for the Court that “there are 
transgender male lawyers in this courtroom following the male dress code and 
going to the men’s room and the . . . Court’s dress code and sex-segregated 
restrooms have not fallen.”37 After this answer, Justice Gorsuch replies sharply 
and in a way that indicates Cole’s message has not gotten all the way through, 
and that it does not register to Justice Gorsuch as responsive. And so Justice 
Gorsuch testily asks, Does Cole want to answer the question he was being asked 
about the “drastic” change a ruling for his client would produce—“or not?”38  
Much as anything else, in re-posing this question Justice Gorsuch indicates 
he has not resolved and released the sense of unease that he previously 
expressed—literally, a sense of wonder about what the case involved and what 
a decision for Stephens would mean for the nation and its people. Needless to 
say, that wonder may have been a wonder in part about how a pro-trans ruling 
would impact trans women, and in part about how it might be related to a pro-
gay ruling in Bostock and Zarda’s cases. But perhaps only in part. 
Another structural possibility that must be considered is whether and how a 
Justice on a trans-low-information Court might easily come away from an 
encounter like this one wondering not, or not only, about the effects of a pro-
trans and/or a pro-gay decision on others, “out there” in the country, in terms of 
what the nation is ready for, but also on himself, knowing or sensing that a pro-
trans ruling, particularly combined with a pro-gay ruling in the other cases, 
might require him, either immediately or with time, “to come to terms with the 
fragile and fluid nature of his own sexual and gender identities.”39 Happily, 
“fragile and fluid” is not the same as nonexistent. This is not about a dissolution 
into nothingness. And that—not nothingness—may prove to be just enough for 
a momentarily perturbed sexual and gender identity to bounce back with 
resilience to produce a decision grounded in conventional reasons about 
statutory interpretation and nothing else. 
 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 27. 
 38 Id. at 23–24 (“And I guess I -- I’d just like you to have a chance to respond to Judge 
Lynch in his thoughtful dissent in which he lamented everything you have before us, but 
suggested that something as drastic a change in this country as bathrooms in every place of 
employment and dress codes in every place of employment that are otherwise gender neutral 
would be change, that that - - that that’s an essentially legislative decision.”); id. at 28 (“or 
not”) (emphasis added). 
 39 Thomas, supra note 8, at 81. 
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Here, then, is a wonder about the kind of wonder that may have been afoot 
at the Supreme Court: Might it have only been Justice Gorsuch who experienced 
it this way in that courtroom? Going into deliberations after oral arguments, 
Justice Gorsuch had an active sense that the trans sex discrimination case—and 
to the extent he thought it tied to, or even on some level the same thing as, the 
gay sex discrimination cases, possibly all the Title VII sex discrimination 
cases—involved something portentous, maybe ineffably portentous, something 
far in excess of what is comfortably within the reach of a conservative Supreme 
Court Justice’s starting-point sense of how the Court is supposed to move: 
tentatively, incrementally, surefootedly from “molar to molecular motions,” not 
in large, bold, pathmarking leaps.40 
The imaginary shower scene that, in various ways, was mobilized against 
pro-LGBT sex-discrimination positions in the cases is unquestionably capable 
of inspiring a “‘wonder’ or epistemic panic” that shakes traditional sexual and 
gender differences to their foundations, along the lines that Bursch and Justice 
Alito and Justice Gorsuch most clearly gave different kinds of expression.41 But 
a majority of the Supreme Court need not achieve the level of a full-on panic—
or crisis—in order for a number of Justices, even pro-LGBT-inclined Justices, 
to feel the pull of the cultural forces that the shower’s return organizes. 
This could lead the Court from pro-LGBT positions, as Bursch and Jeffrey 
Harris hoped, or, on reflection, having processed them thoroughly at the level 
of reason, it could push the Court away from the forms of sex-based and 
discriminatory thinking the shower scene reflects, hence toward pro-LGBT 
outcomes in the cases. Quite apart from the Supreme Court’s formal disposition 
of Gerald Bostock’s, Donald Zarda’s, and Aimee Stephens’s Title VII sex 
discrimination cases, the litigation they involved at the Court confirms that the 
shower, itself still related to the closet, still has deep reserves of cultural 
resonance that may set the conditions under which LGBT persons can be 
themselves as who they are in the public world at work. Elite legal audiences 
who pride themselves on their rule-of-law commitments to logic and reason are 
not entirely immune to the gravitational pull of the shower/closet as a cultural 
symbol that can anchor traditionally sex-binaristic ways of living and being-in-
the-world.  
What’s more, as the struggles for LGBT rights go on, the enduring lesson 
of the LGBT Title VII sex discrimination cases is that old cultural forms like 
the shower, which may have seemed to have been dead and gone, relegated to 
the ash heap of history, have an uncanny way of being given new life to carry 
on. They are among the truly dangerous monsters that the LGBT communities 
and those committed to their dignity, their equality, and their rights, must 
confront and do battle with, as evanescent and as trickstery as they are. The full, 
wide future of LGBT freedom is thus through transphobic, sexist, and 
 
 40 The quoted language comes from S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“molar to molecular motions”). 
 41 Thomas, supra note 8, at 81. 
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homophobic fantasies about trans women and gay men in showers with cis-
heterosexuals.42 Those fantasies, whatever their guises, must be confronted, not 
avoided. This is hard work that must be undertaken inside and outside 
courtrooms in ways that are big and small, and it must be pursued, when it can 
be, “[e]very single day, relentlessly.”43 Until the cultural power of these forms 
to deny people the freedom they deserve—whenever that is—is no more. 
 
 42 The same holds for other forms of freedom—perhaps not yet socially imaginable—
that might likewise be regulated by means of logics like those of the shower scene. 
 43 The quote comes from Chase Strangio’s moving remembrance of Lorena Borjas. 
Situated in fuller context, the quote reads: 
     On March 30 at 5:22 a.m., alone in a hospital bed in Coney Island, Lorena Borjas—
the mother, guardian, hero and healer of the transgender community in Jackson Heights, 
Queens—died of complications related to covid-19. 
 
     Borjas, 59, was a relentless advocate who seemed to work 24 hours a day. . . . 
 
     [S]he opened her home to those who had nowhere to go and hosted events. Her smile, 
infectious laugh and overall connective presence calmed so much collective trauma. 
She built countless systems of mutual aid that helped hundreds of people over the past 
30 years[.]  
 
     . . . . 
 
     [Lorena] Borjas fought for others even as she struggled to update her personal 
documents to accurately reflect her female gender, faced deportation or couldn’t access 
the health care that she needed. She fought for others every day even when she too 
contended with the precarity of a life on the edge of so many systemic barriers to 
survival. Even from her hospital bed — as she created an emergency fund for members 
of the trans community affected by covid-19 — she continued to teach us that we have 
to look out for each other, which means inconveniencing ourselves to make space for 
others to thrive. 
 
     This current crisis has exposed the many injustices in our health-care and economic 
systems. Borjas died before she could build the just world she envisioned — a world 
that would have taken better care of her and those she loved. But she worked every day 
to look after her community while relentlessly demanding that governmental and 
nonprofit institutions step up. 
 
     Now she is gone, so we must take up that work. Every single day, relentlessly. 
Chase Strangio, Lorena Borjas, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.washington 
post.com/opinions/2020/04/01/lorena-borjas-guardian-healer-trans-community-new-
york/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/VGF9-9TPL]. 
